Mexican Agricultural Program

The Mexican Agricultural Program (MAP) was an effort during the 1940's through the 1970's to increase food production and to industrialize agriculture in Mexico, through crop breeding and increased use of fertilizer, pesticides, and irrigation. It was a joint effort by the Rockefeller Foundation and the Mexican government. Later, the MAP program was spread to poor countries around the world and renamed the Green Revolution. MAP was the subject of critique from the start as it increased inequality, decreased agrobiodiversity, and generated environmental problems in Mexico.

The Idea
Dr. J.A. Ferrell, an officer at the Rockefeller Foundation who began working on public health in Mexico in 1913 was the first to propose an economic development project in Mexico, the project that would ultimately become the Green Revolution. He made this suggestion in 1936, first speaking to a former minister of agriculture about the possibility of a cooperative venture in agriculture between the Rockefeller Foundation and the Mexican government, and later, with the minister's encouragement, suggesting it to Rockefeller Foundation president Raymond Fosdick.

Henry A. Wallace, newly elected as Vice President of the United States, visited Mexico in 1940. After Wallace returned from Mexico, he met with Ferrell and Fosdick on February 3, 1941 and made the proposal that led to the Green Revolution. According to him, Mexico needed "greater agricultural production." This meeting resulted in what the Rockefeller Foundation called the Mexican Agricultural Program, or MAP.

Planning
Following the meeting with Wallace in 1941, the Rockefeller Foundation sent a team of scientists on a scouting mission to Mexico: Dr. E.C. Stakman, professor of plant protection at University of Minnesota; Dr. Richard Bradfield, professor of soils and agronomy at Cornell University; and Dr. Paul C. Manglesdorf, professor of plant genetics and breeding at Harvard University. After spending July to December 1941 in Mexico, the team made its recommendations.


 * "The observations by Stakman, Bradfield, and Manglesdorf of Mexican agriculture demonstrated their fundamental belief in the importance of scientific agriculture. These scientists described "genetics and plant breeding, plant protection, soil science, livestock management, and general farm management" as the means of improving the five areas of technical assistance [called for in Rockefeller's plans for Mexico]."

Research Stations
In the 1940's, the Rockefeller team set up research stations in Mexico for corn and wheat and, later, sorghum.

Corn
The first research station established was El Horno in Chapingo, adjacent to the National School of Agriculture. There, Dr. Ed J. Wellhausen and others researched corn. After collecting over 2000 strains of native corn from Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean, they narrowed them down to sixteen they felt "possessed superior yield characteristics" and ultimately produced six varieties for distribution to farmers during the 1940s.

Additionally, they convinced the Mexican government to create PRONASE, a national seed production and distribution center, in 1948. PRONASE, like MAP, promoted hybrid corn. However, most farmers could not afford hybrids because they could not afford new seed each season. Because of this, Wellhausen et al also produced "improved varieties" (presumably open pollinated) which farmers could use seed from a past harvest and still get a good yield from it.


 * "Initial population improvements of maize by the MAP contained characteristics valued by many peasant agriculturalists, such as greater forage material (for feed) and prolificacy (greater number of ears per plant). However, even these improved populations often possessed traits that nullified their potential benefits to subsistence producers."

As an example, one such variety of corn could only grow in areas with sufficient rainfall or irrigation. By 1950, only 8 percent of corn grown in Mexico came from MAP's improved varieties and hybrids.

Even though corn is the main staple of Mexico, MAP, under the leadership of George Harrar, did not place a great priority on corn. MAP promoted corn as a "cattle feed and industrial grain." And MAP scientists "ignored the traditional practice of intercropping maize with beans, promoting monoculture instead."

Wheat
One of the first research centers founded in the 1940's was a center led by Norman Borlaug focused on wheat. Wheat was introduced to Mexico by the Spanish and it is eaten by the middle and upper classes, primarily in the cities. When the wheat program was established, the reason for increasing wheat production may have had nothing to do with feeding Mexicans at all and much more with supporting the U.S. war effort. After the war, U.S. researchers continued work on wheat in Mexico because they found it important as a "source of pathogens." Specifically, "The ability to monitor and control pathogens in Mexico and Central America amounted to a savings of millions of dollars for wheat producers in the United States and Canada."

Additionally, the Americans who established the wheat program felt was an untapped market for wheat in Mexico, and along with that market there could be a market for everything from "capitalized inputs for producers to milling and baking equipment for processors." Initially, research focused on disease (rust) resistance.

Although traditionally wheat was grown in central Mexico, MAP located its research station in Mexico's northwest. "In addition to climatic factors favoring wheat selection for disease resistance, scientists welcomed the opportunity to expand wheat among Sonora farmers who had access to machinery, credit, and international, as well as national markets." There, Borlaug worked primarily with "the largest and best financed organization of private producers - the Harvester's Union of Hermosillo". The group also held a considerable bit of political power. In return for MAP's help, in 1954, they provided 100 hectares of land for research, which became, in 1955, the research station at Ciudad Obregon.

Sorghum
In 1948, the Cal Grande research station was established in a region called the Bajio, in the state of Guanajuato. One of their first projects was on sorghum, which is not a food widely eaten in Mexico. The sorghum was not intended for direct human consumption in Mexico, but for livestock. Some criticize the program's use of resources on sorghum and livestock because the poor in Mexico do not eat very many animal products. Additionally:


 * "The test conditions in addition to taking place in the relatively temperate climate of the Bajio also had a plentiful supply of irrigation water. Although sorghum represented a potential contribution to resource poor farmers, the MAP conditioned test materials on resource rich environments. Such experimental conditions supplied scientists with little information about the utility of these sorghum materials in either the climate or conditions under which most of Mexico's agriculturalists labored."

Training Mexican Scientists
Each year, the program admitted 35 to 50 graduates of agricultural colleges to its trainee program. Of these, 20-30 were from Mexico and approximately 15 came from elsewhere in Latin America. The trainees worked as apprentices in the research program. The Mexican trainees were appointed for one year, which was extended for a second year if they do well. The best students were given scholarships to study in the United States, and some were kept in the program in Mexico for more than two years. The remainder were placed in jobs in Mexico after their second year. Many went to work at the Corn Commission, the General Bureau of Agriculture, the Plan Agricola Mexicana, and the Institute of Agricultural Investigation. Non-Mexican trainees were appointed for fifteen months after which the best were given scholarships for advanced academic study and the rest went home to their countries.

Early Controversy
The Rockefeller team of Stakman, Bradfield, and Mangelsdorf recommended a top-down approach. This was at odds with the recommendations of Dr. Carl Sauer, a professor of geography at University of California at Berkeley who was very familiar with Mexico. Rockefeller Foundation consulted Sauer, who recommended a more bottom up approach that involved building on the peasants' knowledge of agriculture. Sauer also worried that pushing high-yielding hybrids on Mexico would ruin their genetic resources for maize. He said that "Mexican agriculture cannot be pointed toward standardization on a few commercial types without upsetting native economy and culture hopelessly." and "Unless the Americans understand that, they'd better keep out of this country entirely."


 * "In concluding his remarks on agriculture, Sauer reminded the officers of the Foundation that plants such as maize had a much more varied use in Mexico than was true of the same plant in the United States. As a result of these differences, Sauer cautioned against applying the agricultural sciences to recreate the history of U.S. commercial agriculture in Mexico." Yet, "in spite of the severity of Sauer's observations, the Foundation set the stage for the management of science according to the logic of commercial production."

Later, Sauer also argued that the Foundation's work on wheat, barley, and alfalfa were misplaced. Wheat and barley cultivation in Mexico had been promoted by the Spanish, even though the crops were "ill-suited to the ecology and economy of Mexican villages." Sauer thought that the Mexicans would benefit far more from work on legumes. Internal Rockefeller studies also concurred with Sauer, finding that the Mexican diet, based on locally grown foods, was "fundamentally sound" and that there was no need to substantially change it.

Despite the contemporary critiques to the Mexican Agricultural Program, the leaders at Rockefeller moved forward. Mangelsdorf, for example, dismisses Sauer's critiques as follows:


 * "If the program does not succeed, it will not only have represented a colossal waste of money, but will probably have done the Mexicans more harm than good. If it does 'succeed,' it will mean the disappearance of many ancient Mexicans varieties of corn and other crops and perhaps the destruction of many picturesque folk ways, which are of great interest to the anthropologist. In other words, to both Anderson and Sauer, Mexico is a kind of glorified ant hill which they are in the process of studying. They resent any effort to 'improve' the ants. They much prefer to study them as they now are."

Social, Economic, and Political Implications
By 1949, Dr. John S. Dickey, one of the Foundation's trustees was aware that if the program's work changed agriculture in Mexico too significantly, it would greatly increase the inequality between the rich and the poor and could become a basis for political instability. He predicted "political problems not now even dimly perceived by many Mexicans.[31]" Dickey wanted Rockefeller to be judged only on "the validity of scientific experiments" and he didn't want any unrest in Mexico to be blamed on Rockefeller Foundation's work to jeopardize plans to expand the Green Revolution in other parts of the world.

Even then, the social, economic, and political implications of the work was undeniable. However, "during the 1940s the Mexican Agricultural Program proceeded toward the goal of increased productivity without any further consideration about the social consequences of this enterprise. The anticipation of negative consequences only signaled to the Foundation officers that it might be necessary to work more strenuously to limit notions of responsibility within the scientific community."

Research Stations
In the 1950's, MAP founded new research stations that focused on livestock, sorghum, and barley, and moved their wheat program to a large area donated in Ciudad Obregon.

Sorghum
The sorghum program continued and, in 1959, the Cal Grande research station was moved to to El Roque, Guanajuato, where sorghum research could be coordinated with cattle production.

By the early 1960's, sorghum production "expanded dramatically, largely because of its application to feedlots in Mexico." Where sorghum cultivation went up, corn cultivation went down. For farmers, sorghum was cheaper to grow than corn. It made for a cheap feed for livestock, particularly hogs and poultry. The scientists "actively encouraged" feeding sorghum to livestock "with the assumption that this provided a cheaper and more efficient means for producing quality (i.e. high protein) foods." However, as late as the early 1980's, chicken, pork, and eggs were barely present in the diet of average Mexicans. "At the same time the Foundation expanded agricultural production in Mexico, it structured utilization according to a logic of profit, not consumption."

Barley
At the Cal Grande research station, scientists also worked on barley. Prior to MAP, barley was not a major crop or food in Mexico. Some 4 percent of barley went toward malts (probably beer), 65 percent went to livestock, and no more than 10 percent was eaten directly by humans. Despite this, MAP began working with barley in the 1950's. The impetus for barley research was the Mexican Association of Malters.

In 1954, under pressure from Mexico's Minister of Agriculture, the barley work came to a halt. "Research on a commodity that not only had limited public benefits but received stimulus from private corporations might well jeopardize MAP's attempt to maintain autonomy with the guise of scientific objectivity."

The barley research "sought by malting interests in Mexico" was resumed by early 1957. When it did, it did so in cooperation with the Mexican Association of Malters with two clear aims: malting and feed grains. While barley has some potential to grow under marginal conditions, the varieties pursued were developed for irrigated land and mechanical harvesting.

Livestock and Feed Grains
Livestock and feed grain research took place at a research station established in 1958 at La Campana in the Mexican state of Chihuahua. The Mexican government did not promote livestock as a high priority, but MAP did. "It is particularly the livestock/feed complex that had most important consequences for Mexico's food production system."

A 1951 report by Dr. Herrell De Graff (a consultant to the Rockefeller Foundation's Social Science Division) promoted increased production of livestock and feed grains. However, the report noted that this would create a competition between use of grains for human food or as livestock feed and that Mexico's poor could not afford animal products.

Despite their enthusiasm, work on livestock went slowly. A forage crop program was established in 1953, and a poultry project in 1955. At a 1956 meeting, Dr. John Pino stated concerns about the wisdom of feeding grains to livestock instead of people. Norman Borlaug expressed concerns about erosion due to overgrazing, suggesting the Foundation support forestation instead of livestock in areas prone to erosion.

By 1956, Drs. Roderic Buller and Pino were working with "one of the largest and most powerful associations of livestock producers in the country," the Livestock Union of Chihuahua. The livestock research station, La Campana, was established by 1958, with pastures and funding provided by the Livestock Union.

In 1959, Kenneth L. Turk, a consultant for the Foundation, traveled around Mexico to plan for an expanded livestock program. He met with large landholders, multinational corporations such as Ralston Purina and Carnation, and powerful associations, including the patronatos (associations of large scale farmers) up by MAP. "He identified research needs of wealthy agriculturalists as the basis for determining the content and direction of research in the animal sciences in Mexico." Turk praised both Ralston Purina and Carnation, despite complaints about them from local farmers. According to Turk, "Farmers angry with these corporations represented a problem to be solved through cooperation with these corporate agribusinesses." The overall decision from Turk's work was "to construct an expanded livestock industry in the Bajio on a collection of large farms linked to multinational corporations."

The sum total of the work on livestock was to create a population of animals that requires pastures and feed, often competing with production of food for direct human consumption.

Wheat
As noted above, MAP began its wheat research, led by Norman Borlaug in the 1940's. In 1954, the Harvester's Union of Hermosillo provided MAP with 100 hectares of land for research, which became, in 1955, the research station at Ciudad Obregon, in the Mexican state of Sonora.

Borlaug also worked toward large scale cultivation, processing, and marketing of wheat, including arranging federal support for large amounts of fertilizer and commitments by the government to buy up surpluses. The wheat breeding did not just focus on yield but also on industrial needs. The wheat needed to be able to be planted and harvested mechanically, and it needed to be suitable for large scale commercial milling and baking. Borlaug sent any promising varieties to the USDA for milling and baking quality tests.

Disagreements with the Mexican Government
The 1950's saw some political troubles for MAP in Mexico. In 1952, Mexico swapped out President Miguel Aleman for President Rodolfo Ruiz Cortinez. Cortinez brought in a new Minister of Agriculture, Flores Munoz. Munoz "challenged the research agenda set by MAP scientists." ) Munoz called for a rapid increase in corn production, which MAP scientists did not see as so urgent. Also, Munoz placed MAP and its Office of Special Studies (OSS or OEE in Spanish - Oficina de Estudios Especiales) under his direct control, which did not make the MAP folks happy. They dismissed the warning about insufficient maize production as a myth. Noting that the years between 1953-1957 saw a 40 percent increase in corn prices and record levels of imports, Bruce H. Jennings says: "The major concern of MAP rested not with the public health of Mexicans, but maintaining control over research agendas."

In 1955, another research branch of the Ministry of Agriculture, the IIA (Institute of Agricultural Investigations) criticized MAP's focus on irrigated corn, noting that irrigated corn only accounts for 5.3 percent of Mexico's corn. To pursue an increase in output, scientists would do better to focus on the 94.7 percent of corn grown in non-irrigated regions of Mexico. The IIA put quite a bit of research focus into creating improved varieties that were not hybrids to make them more suitable for adoption by peasants.

Officials in charge of MAP, unhappy with Munoz, got Dean Rusk, President of the Rockefeller Foundation at that time, to go to Mexico and visit President Cortinez about the matter, securing the president's commitment to MAP autonomy. "By 1954 Dr. Harrar and associates managed to overtake Flores Munoz through the professional corps of Mexicans trained in the Office of Special Studies." In other words, so many employees in Mexico's Ministry of Agriculture had been trained by the Office of Special Studies that any action Munoz tried to take against it would be met with resistance from his own staff. "One consequence soon to follow this victory resulted with placing greater resources at the disposal of fewer farmers." "By 1956, the Ministry of Agriculture allocated 96 percent of its seed producing capacity for the production of hybrids," yet, by 1966, only 10 percent of Mexican farmers had adopted hybrids.

Social, Economic, and Political Implications
Rockefeller's work with agriculture served "as a means of redefining productive relations according to the interests of capitalists in both the United States and Mexico." Additionally, according to Bruce H. Jennings, the scientists proved to be an incredibly effective group to challenge the government on behalf of "parochial, nationalist, and antiquated capitalist interest." He says:


 * "Although political leaders of the 1940s conceived of science and technology as a means of controlling agrarian reform and guiding it toward class interests, by the 1950s scientists represented a force that on certain occasions and in specific settings directed the state towards ends largely defined by their professional, albeit capitalist-bound, interests."

Criticism
Even amidst widespread praise, the Mexican Agricultural Program was not free of criticism:


 * "In 1964 French-trained agronomo Jesus Uribe Ruiz denounced Mexico's "intoxificacion tecnica" (intoxication with technicality), the MAP, and its Green Revolution. Combining nationalism with professional pride, he compared Mexico to China during the Boxer Rebellion by claiming that the MAP "deformed and even worse de-Mexicanized agricultural research," ignoring Mexican farmers' needs to solve the problems of U.S. agriculture, like chahuixtle. The foundation's management of the ENA's experimentation station, "as if it was understood that the school is incapable of doing it," insulted him. He told Mexican researchers not to follow "foreigners" orders because it eroded their prestige. Calling the SAF [Secretaria de Agricultura y Fomento - Ministry of Agriculture and Development] "ineffective," he claimed that its scientists concentrated excessively on plant breeding and urged them to find other ways to raise productivity. Recognizing that peasants could not use hybrid corn, he claimed that the new seeds made rich farmers richer and poor ones poorer, joined critics who lamented the SAF's lack of interest in de temporal [rainfed] and tropical agriculture, and said that by promoting the Green Revolution, "each campesino becomes a living example of the mistakes of research and he denigrates it at every opportunity," eroding the profession's prestige... He thought that many peasant farming practices were primitive and admitted that agronomos had problems working with campesinos because they gave orders like hacienda mayordomos supervising social inferiors, but he wanted to include them in the discourse of modernization. "One must hear, see, and understand the peasants to know their motivations, their opinions, their problems, and then translate this dialogue into technical language accessible to research workers, to find approaches that work in [their] language." To train more campesinos as agronomos, he urged the ENA to drop the preparatorio (preparatory) degree requirement because there were few of these schools in rural areas."

Under criticism that the Green Revolution was not reaching the campesinos (peasants), Mexico's Ministry of Agriculture and Development launched a program to extend Green Revolution technologies and gains to the peasants of the state of Puebla (the Plan Puebla) in 1967. However, this effort failed. Peasants preferred their traditional corn over the hybrid for a number of reasons: the hybrid produced fewer kernels and had a shorter stalk that provided less feed for livestock; tortillas made from hybrid corn had an unpleasant taste and texture; and the hybrid was less resistant to corn worms. The peasants could not afford pesticides to control the corn worms. Additionally, the hybrid's growing season required a planting time that made it more vulnerable to late frosts than traditional varieties of corn.


 * "During the 1960s critics began to attach the economic effect of the Green Revolution. In 1964 the UN's World Health Organization warned that raising Third World farm productivity would drive peasants off the land. In 1967 agricultural economist W. Whitney Hicks said that the Green Revolution made some Mexicans farmers prosper and gain political influence, especially in the northern irrigation districts, but it bypassed campesinos who grew de temporal [rainfed] corn. In 1969 Hicks' findings were confirmed by Donald K. Freebairn; Lena Dalrymple of AID, who called Mexico "hardly a complete model for other less developed nations" ; and R. D'Shaw of the Overseas Development Council, who found that the Green Revolution did not create more rural employment. ... Anthropologist Gunnar Myrdal urged scientists to develop labor-intensive technologies "appropriate" for peasant farmers and to lobby for Third World land reform."

Despite the criticism, "The Mexican government denied that the Green Revolution had problems."


 * "Tierra praised the MAP but admitted that the SAF's research targeted the irrigation districts, that hybrid corn had limited acceptance, and that the Green Revolution did not bring prosperity to the campesinos, demanded a study to discover why, and urged the agency to study de temporal agriculture. The editors also said that farmers used too many chemical fertilizer and recommended more research on organic farming and pollution and soil erosion control."


 * "Recognizing the "pesticide cycle," Blanco Macias decried the harmful effects of DDT, calling pesticides "a terrible Frankenstein returning to destroy its creator."

Social and Economic Consequences

 * "Campesinos who fled rural areas while the Green Revolution and the internationalization of Mexican agriculture proceeded did not get jobs as teachers, medical doctors, or even industrial workers as Stakman and his colleagues predicted; they struggled to find work and lived in growing shantytowns surrounding urban centers like Mexico City... When the army fired on student protestors in Tlatelolco, it was obvious that 20 years of eform followed by 25 of economic growth brought inequality and little social justice or democracy."

Ecological Consequences
Many have blamed the Mexican Agricultural Program and the Green Revolution for the spread of pesticides into poor countries and the ecological consequences that have resulted from their use. Additionally:


 * "In 1963 scientists raised the issue of genetic erosion as farmers abandoned native strains to plant uniform scientifically created varieties. Experts discussed the problem at a 1967 conference in Rome and announced that the spread of Green Revolution strains threatened global food security and future advances in plant breeding."

Related Sourcewatch articles

 * Rockefeller Foundation
 * Green Revolution
 * Timeline of the Green Revolution
 * U.S. Agency for International Development
 * Norman Borlaug
 * World Bank

Books

 * Bruce H. Jennings, Foundations of International Agricultural Research: Science and Politics in Mexican Agriculture, 1988, Westview Press, Boulder, Co.
 * Lester R. Brown, Seeds of Change: The Green Revolution and Development in the 1970's, 1970, Praeger Publishers, New York.
 * E.C. Stakman, Richard Bradfield, and Paul C. Mangelsdorf, Campaigns Against Hunger, 1967, The Belknap Press, Cambridge, MA.
 * Mark Dowie, American Foundations: An Investigative History, 2001, The MIT Press.
 * Joseph Cotter, Troubled Harvest: Agronomy and Revolution in Mexico, 1880-2002, Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 2003.
 * Cynthia Hewitt de Alcántara, ''La modernización de la agricultura mexicana, 1940-1970. Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1978.
 * Gustavo Esteva. The Struggle for Rural Mexico. South Hardy, Massachusetts: Bergin and Garvey, 1983.